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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
JAMES L. BARKER, JR., TRUSTEE
IN THE MATTER OF GEORGE
RAY DUNHAM, VOL UN TAR Y
BANKRUPT,
Platnti!f and Aptpellant.
vs.

Case No.
9012

GEORGE R. DUNHAM AND LEODA
S. DUNHAM, HIS WIFE,
Defendants and Resp-ondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The plaintiff, as trustee in the voluntary bankruptcy
of the defendant, George Ray Dunham, brought this action
in behalf of the only two creditors named in the bankrupt's
petition to have a certain conveyance of real property from
the voluntary bankrupt to his defendant wife, set aside as
a fraudulent conveyance made with intent to hinder, delay
and defraud said creditors.
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From an adverse judgment of the Court below, sitting
without a jury, plaintiff brings his case to this Honorable
Court on appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
As a result of an automobile accident which occurred
on November 8, 1953, judgments were entered against the
defendant, George R. Dunham in favor of Fred B. Garrett
and Bruce R. Sizemore in the sum of $51,840.00, plus costs,
in the District Court of Summit County, State of Utah, on
September 10, 1954 (R. 9, 10, 28, 65). La Mar Duncan
served as counsel for the defendant, George R. Dunham,
during the. entire course of this litigation (Tr. 33, 34).
Nineteen days following this automobile accident, in which
the defendant, George R. Dunham, was seriously injured
and hospitalized, there was recorded in the office of the
County Recorder of Summit County, a warranty deed dated
upon its face, November 1, 1952, and purporting to have
been acknowledged before La Mar Duncan on that same
date, conveying all of defendant George R. Dunham's interest in and to certain real property located in Summit County,
Utah, to his wife, the defendant Leoda S. Dunham (R. 10,
28, 118, 119, Tr. 26, 51). This property had been conveyed
to GEORGE R. DUNHAM AND LEODA S. DUNHAM,
HIS WIFE, AS JOINT TENANTS WITH FULL RIGHTS
OF SURVIVORSHIP, AND NOT AS TENANTS IN COMMON, by warranty deed dated January 6, 1951, from Carrie
N. Kirkpatrick, which was recorded January 12, 1951 (R.
94) . The deed from George R. Dunham to his wife did not
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include improvements and waters rights as are contained
in the deed from Carrie N. Kirkpatrick to the defendants
as joint tenants (See Plaintiff's exhibits No. 1 and No. 13,
R. 94, 118, 119). The defendants' own testimony indicates
that the property was originally sold in 1944 by Carrie N.
Kirkpatrick upon contract to George R. Dunham alone (Tr.
16-17, 21, 60, 64-67, 77).
Subsequent to November 1, 1952, claimed by defendants
to be the date of execution and delivery of the deed from
the defendant husband to his wife, and prior to November
8, 1953, the date of the automobile accident which resulted in
the judgments against Mr. Dunham, the defendants conveyed eight separate parcels of the land acquired from
Carrie N. Kirkpatrick and each such deed showed the grantors to be GEORGE R. DUNHAM AND LEODA S. DUNHAM, HIS WIFE. (See plaintiff's exhibits Numbers 2-9,
inclusive, R. 96-111). On October 22, 1953, just seventeen
days before the automobile accident referred to above, there
was recorded at the request of George R. Dunham, a subdivision plat of Kamp Killkare, being a portion of the land
conveyed to the defendants by Carrie N. Kirkpatrick. (See
plaintiff's exhibit No. 12, R. 116-117, as further explained
by the County Recorder in Tr. 128-130). And on October
26, 1953, just thirteen days before the accident, a mortgage
was negotiated on the subject property with GEORGE R.
DUNHAM AND LEODA S. DUNHAM, HIS WIFE, named
as mortgagors. (See plaintiff's exhibit No. 15, R. 123-125).
Following the automobile accident on November 8, 1953,
and the recording of the deed from Mr. Dunham to his wife
on November 27, 1953, the manner of conveying and en-
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cumbering the land was radically changed by defendants.
Thus a mortgage to Kamas State Bank, executed on April
12, 1954, designating the mortgagors. as LEODA S. DUNHAM AND GEORGE R. DUNHAM, HER HUSBAND, was
signed by Mrs. Dunham only. (See plaintiff's exhibit No.
14, R. 120-122). In addition warranty deeds. of small parcels
of land sold to Roy M. Thornton and Anna Ruth Thornton,
his wife, in February 1, 1954, and to Harold Sanders and
Edith Sanders, his wife, in June 21, 1954, were executed
solely by Mrs. Dunham. (See Plaintiff's exhibits No. 10
and 11, R. 112-115).
It is undisputed that no consideration or payment was
given to defendant George R. Dunham by his wife for the
transfer of title into her name only and that said George
R. Dunham owned no property after the delivery of the
Deed conveying his interest to his wife. (Pre-trial Order,
Sections 2 (c) and (d) , R. 52) . Defendant Leoda S. Dunham testified that her husband had not been employed,
other than helping her, since 1951 (Tr. 78). She also testified that she did not pay him a salary or give him an allowance for his services (Tr. 79). However, at the purported
time of executing the deed conveying his interest to his wife
Mr. Dunham was obligated on a note secured by a mortgage
to the Coalville Bank (Tr. 74-75, 141). He thereafter obligated himself on another note secured by a mortgage to the
Kamas State Bank on October 26, 1953. (See plaintiff's
exhibit No. 15, R. 123-125).
Mrs. Dunham further testified that she gave her husband full authority to handle the management of the sale of
lots upon the property because of her lack of knowledge in
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real estate matters (Tr. 66, 139). She further testified that
her husband lived upon the property and that she allowed
him to tell other people that he owned the property (Tr.
78-79). The testimony of Herbert Frank Heinhold, who
was one of the purchasers of the lot from the defendants
on August 3, 1953, shortly before the automobile accident,
further emphasizes the fact that Mr. Dunham exercised all
the power of an owner over this property by showing it to
prospective purchasers and accepting payment upon consummated sales without limitation by his wife (Tr. 112115).
On August 17, 1956, the defendant George R. Dunham
filed his voluntary petition in bankruptcy, No. B-279-56,
with the United States District Court for the Central District of Utah, naming as his only creditors Fred B. Garrett
and Bruce R. Sizemore, and on August 22, 1956, he was
duly adjudged a bankrupt in said proceedings and on September 12, 1956, the plaintiff was appointed trustee of the
bankrupt's estate for the benefit of creditors. (See paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of plaintiff's amended complaint admitted
in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the fourth defense in defendant's
answer, R. 9, 28) .
The evidence in support of the defendants' contention
that the deed in question did not constitute a fraudulent
conveyance is conflicting and manifestly inconsistent. Mr.
Dunham testified that the property was originally purchased
with his wife's own money, because he drank up all he made
but he could not explain why the purchase contract was
originally put in his own name alone (Tr. 23). He also
testified that he "partially" negotiated the sale with Mrs.
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Kirkpatrick (Tr. 22). As to the date and place of execution
of the deed in question, Mr. Dunham testified as follows,
at page 26-27 of the transcript:
"Q. Is that your signature at the bottom, Mr.
Dunham?
"A. It looks like it. You bet. It must be.
"Q.

"A.
"Q.

"A.

That is your signature?
Yes.
Where did you write that signature?
I don't remember.

"Q. Were you in the hospital at the time, Mr.
Dunham?
"A. I wouldn't-/ can't remember when that
was signed.
"Q. Did Mr. Duncan prepare this deed and
bring it to you, Mr. Dunham, at the hospital?
"A. I don't remember if anybody brought it to
me, but that is my signature. I don't know where it
was executed. I don't know where it was signed because I don't remember.

"Q. Now, Mr. Dunham, isn't it true that Mr.
Duncan brought this to you in November of 1953
when you were in the Veterans Hospital after the
accident that you had when you injured yourself and
Mr. Sizemore and Mr. Garrett?

"Mr. Pratt: If the court please, I will object
to that question. I think it is an attempt to vary this
document which he's introduced as an exhibit and
which is dated November 1, 1952, and acknowledged.
"THE COURT: The objection is overruled.
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"Q. Isn't that the place and the time that you
signed this document when you were in fear of your
life because of that accident?
"A. It could be very well.

"MR. PRATT: Now, if the court please, which
time are we talking about? Are we talking about the
time on the deed or some other time?
"MR. CASSITY : I am talking about the time
that I stated. It is very clear.
"THE COURT: You don't need to argue with
counsel or explain to him.
"Q. Do you remember whether anyone aside
from yourself and Mr. Duncan was present at the
time you signed this deed?
"A. I don't even remember when I signed it."
(Emphasis added.)

Mrs. Dunham testified that she and her husband were
working as cooks for the Union Pacific Railroad when the
property was purchased from Mrs. Kirkpatrick (Tr. 52-53)
and that Mr. Dunham did not work for anyone else during
the periods of time they operated the beer tavern after purchasing it (Tr. 54). She testified that she earned a little
under two hundred dollars per month and her husband
earned about two hundred twenty-five dollars per month
while working for the railroad (Tr. 91) and that she had
received seven hundred dollars back pay and her husband
had received eight hundred dollars back pay from the railroad just prior to purchasing the property from Mrs. Kirkpatrick (Tr. 63, 131-132). She also testified that her husband was drinking away all his income at this time and was
inebriated very often but that he never missed his work on
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the railroad (Tr. 55-57). Furthermore, she did not deny
that the original purchase contract was made in the name
of her husband alone (Tr. 64-67). With respect to the execution of the deed from her husband to herself, thus ending
their joint tenancy, Mrs. Dunham testified that Mr. Dunham's illness prompted this action (Tr. 68) and that she
and her husband consulted La Mar Duncan, an attorney, to
prepare the deed (Tr. 68-69). However, in dealing with
prospective purchasers of lots at arm's length, both before
and after the purported date of execution of the questioned
deed, Mrs. Dunham testified that the defendants never consulted an attorney to prepare the necessary deeds which,
by their nature, required new legal descriptions (Tr. 69-71).
And, although the defendants were allegedly anxious enough
about effecting a change of ownership that they sought out
an attorney in Salt Lake City, Utah, to prepare the deed
for them, they were not concerned with having it recorded
(Tr. 72). Instead, the deed was purportedly placed in a
steel box in Mrs. Dunham's bedroom and removed for recordation only after Mr. Dunham's automobile accident
(Tr. 72-73). Furthermore, Mrs. Dunham testified that the
deed was dated and acknowledged as shown upon its face,
but admitted that she never represented herself to be the sole
owner to prospective purchasers following that date (Tr.
76-77). Among the many Freudian "slips" evidencing common and accepted concepts of ownership and contributions
and long, established matters of fact in the minds of the
defendants concerning the property in question, plaintiff
cites the following as illustrative :
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1. When asked at what time the defendants left the
railroad and moved into the property in question, Mr. Dunham answered as follows at page 18 of the transcript:

"A. Well, I think we-I don't remember, but
we made the first-she made the first letter and the
first-sent the first money to Mrs. Kirkpatrick I
think and had the property. I don't know. It has
been too long ago for me to remember."
2. In response to a question concerning her husband's
drinking habits on page· 55 of the transcript, Mrs. Dunham
answered as follows :
"A. Did you mean in the earlier part of our
marriage, or did you mean after we negotiated for
the property?" (Emphasis added.)
3. In answer to a question as to when the property
was originally purchased, Mrs. Dunham answered thusly
at page 60 of the transcript:
"A. Well, we-I think I sent a retainer-. I'm
not exactly sure-! think I sent a retainer fee to sort
of hold it, don't you see, until we got there, and I
think I finished paying for it the day I moved in, if
I am not mistaken. I don't recall exactly, but it
seems to me that that was the way it was."
And again on the same page when asked how much time
elapsed from sending the retainer to Mrs. Kirkpatrick before the defendants moved into the property, Mrs. Dunham
stated:
"A. Well, I wouldn't know exactly because it
was springtime-it was early spring when wewhen I negotiated with Mrs. Kirkpatrick, and it was
May when I moved in."
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4. Again, at page 63 of the transcript, in answer to a
question concerning when the balance of the down payment
was made to Mrs. Kirkpatrick, Mrs. Dunham testified:
"A. The balance of that payment should have
been made by May 1, when we took-when I took
occupancy."
Insofar as La Mar Duncan's testimony is concerned,
he stated positively that the instrument was executed and
acknowledged upon the dates shown on its face (Tr. 30-33).
Thus Mr. Duncan could recall vividly the date that he acknowledged a deed in a routine matter, but he thereafter could
not remember, and in fact, denied, signing stipulated judgments agains his client, Mr. Dunham, in excess of fifty
thousand dollars as a result of the actions that arose from
the automobile accident (Tr. 34-35). However, upon being
shown the stipulated judgments in the trial records of the
cases involved, he then remembered signing them (Tr. 3738). The court then sustained an objection by defendant's
counsel to the evidence concerning the stipulations upon
the ground that plaintiff's counsel had delayed Mr. Duncan's testimony 30 minutes because of stipulations claimed
by plaintiff to be on the way to the court when in fact they
were available to plaintiff all the time and for the further
reason that this constituted impeachment of plaintiff's
own witness (Tr. 38-39). The court thereafter refused
plaintiff's counsel an opportunity to explain that affidavits
actually on the way from Salt Lake City were the basis of
counsel's request for delay in Mr. Duncan's testimony and
not the stipulations produced. (Tr. 7, 28, 38, 41, and see
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affidavit of Donn E. Cassity filed with the motion for new
trial, R. 72-75).
Mr. Lefler of the Kamas State Bank testified on direct
examination directly opposite to Mrs. Dunham in that he
claimed she was the spokes.man and handled all transactions
concerning this property (Tr. 93) which is at variance
with the statements of Mrs. Dunham (Tr. 66, 139). He
claimed he was aware of the deed from Mr. Dunham to Mrs.
Dunham when the first mortgage with his bank was obtained in late 1953, but that the bank required the signatures of both parties to the mortgage to conform to the
county records (Tr. 93-95). On cross examination he stated
that, although he had heard of the deed in question, he
never saw it until it was recorded (Tr. 98-99).
The testimony of defendants' witness, Le1and L. Layton,
is most revealing. Upon direct examination, when asked of
his knowledge concerning the execution of a deed from Mr.
Dunham to Mrs. Dunham, he answered as follows, at page
144 of the transcript:
"A. I am referring to the deed of where George
put the property fully into Leoda's name. That is
the deed that I was going to give an answer to. In
1953, the early part of 1953, George and I was out
fishing at one time, and it was after his sickness at
Coalville. He told me that he was going to put all of
the property into Leoda's name." (Emphasis added).
Upon cross examination he stated that this statement
was made to him by Mr. Dunham in September or October
after he purchased his first lot, which was August 5, 1953
(Tr. 146-147). Again upon redirect examination concern-
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ing his knowledge of the deed in question, the witness responded as follows, at page 148 of the transcript:
"Q. Had you had conversations with Mr. Dunham prior to that time? You mentioned that you had
knowledge of a deed or something. Now, is the deed

"THE COURT: I don't know-I'm not sure he's
said that he had any knowledge. He just told me that
Mr. Dunham said he was going to put that property
-going to put all his property in his wife's name.
"A. The first-if I may, the first knowledge
that I ever had of any deed was the day that George
Dunham told me he was having a deed drawn up
throwing all the property to Leoda.
"THE COURT: And that is the day you have
told me about here?
"A. That was the day that-that's the day that
I told you about there.
"THE COURT: Some days when a man wishes
he had stayed home in bed, aren't there, Mr. Pratt?"
With respect to the testimony of Mr. Layton, as above
set forth, the court opined as follows in granting the defendants judgment for no cause of action, at page 155 of
the transcript :
"THE COURT: I have to ignore what Mr. Layton said there. Either he didn't understand, or else
it was a man that doesn't have anything and still
trying to impress somebody to make him think he's
got it, or else he is in error on the date, or else he
wanted to help and didn't know how. That was my
impression, that Mr. Layton was trying to help his
friends and didn't know how. The defendants may
have judgment for no cause of action."
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT IS
CONTRARY TO THE LAW AND THE EVIDENCE.
POINT II
}!

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN MAKING
AND ENTERING ITS FINDINGS OF FACT
NUMBERED 4, 5 AND 7 FOR THE REASON
THAT SUCH FINDINGS OF FACT ARE CONTRARY TO THE GREAT WEIGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE AND CONTRARY TO LAW.

POINT III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN MAKING
AND ENTERING ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
FOR THE REASONS THAT THERE WAS NOT
SUFFICIENT COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT OR WARRANT SUCH CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND SUCH CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW ARE CONTRARY TO THE LAW PERTAINING TO FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
AND DELIVERY OF DEEDS.

POINT IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE THE
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TESTIMONY OF LA MAR DUNCAN PERTAINING TO STIPULATED JUDGMENTS EN""
TERED IN THE CIVIL CASES BROUGHT BY
BRUCE R. SIZEMORE AND FRED B. GARRETT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT GEORGE
R. DUNHAM WHILE MR. DUNCAN WAS ATTORNEY FOR SAID DEFENDANT.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT IS
CONTRARY TO THE LAW AND THE EVIDENCE.
By its very nature fraud, and the proof thereof, lies
most conveniently nestled in the bosoms of those who are
participants therein. The process of dislodging the truth
from those nefarious hearts involves such ingenious deviation as to make the odds of success most prohibitive. Such
has been the task of the plaintiff in this case. In this regard
it will be noted that the plaintiff's entire case necessarily
rested upon the evidence to be adduced from the defendants
and those in close confidential relationship with the defendants, except for matters of public record. However, the
seeds of fraud bear the tell-tale fruit of original sin as the
facts of this case most eloquently display.
There can be no argument that if the deed in question
was actually executed after the date of the accident which
gave rise to the creditors' claims against Mr. Dunham, it
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would be fraudulent and void as to such creditors. An actual
intent to hinder, delay or defraud, as would be shown by
the falsification of the dates of execution and acknowledgment of the deed involved in this case, would stamp this
conveyance as fraudulent against the grantor's creditors
even if the conveyance had been supported by a valuable
consideration. Pomeroy's Equity Juris prudence, Fifth Edition, § 971; Sections 25-1-7 and 25-1-8, U. C. A. 1953.
Let us now view the evidence with res.pect to the actual
date of execution and acknowledgment of the deed in question. Upon its face it is dated November 1, 1952, and acknowledged the same date by the attorney who subsequently
defended Mr. Dunham in the actions arising from the automobile accident on November 8, 1953. The date of recordation of this deed is most significant-November 27, 1953,
nineteen days following the accident. Between November
1, 1952, the purported date of the deed, and November 8,
1953, the date of the accident, no less than eight conveyances
of land were made by the defendants showing George R.
Dunham and Leoda S. Dunham, his wife, as grantors. During this same period of time, a subdivision plat of the land
was recorded at the request of George R. Dunham and a
new mortgage was negotiated upon the property naming
George R. Dunham and Leoda S. Dunham, his wife, as mortgagors. Not one single instrument was executed during
this time designating Leoda S. Dunham as the sole owner
nor did any single instrument even infer that such might
be the case. Not so following the date of the accident and
recordation of the deed in question. The county records
from this time forward clearly indicate that ownership was
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then being asserted by one person alone, namely Leoda S.
Dunham. It is clear and undisputed that George R. Dunham
exercised dominion and control over the sale of lots and
represented himself as an owner of the property during the
period of time between the purported date of the deed in
question and the automobile accident referred to above.
Mr. Dunham himself testified that he couldn't remember
where or when he signed the deed but that it could very well
be that it was brought to the Veteran's Hospital by Mr.
Duncan following the automobile accident for his signature.
This admission by the grantor himself fits perfectly the
mosaic of fraud that all the remaining circumstances would
indicate, but, unlike an inference to be drawn from circumstantial evidence, it is direct evidence of a fraudulent act
committed with a fraudulent intent. Add to this the precise testimony of defendant's own witness, Mr. Layton,
with reference to the statements made to him by Mr. Dunham concerning the transfer of title to Mrs. Dunham. He
positively established the time that said statements were
made-subsequent to August 5, 1953, the date he purchased
his first lot from the Dunhams. Upon direct examination
and redirect examination by defendant's counsel he reiterated that Mr. Dunham had told him that he, Mr. Dunham,
"was going to put all the property in Leoda's name." Thus,
long after the purported date of the deed in question, the
grantor therein made known his intention to convey to his
wife as a future possibility not as a matter of past actuality.
It should also be borne in mind that if this witness had any
interest to serve in the case it would be that of the defendants and not the plaintiff. This evidence again establishes
the actual intent of the defendants to defraud their credi-
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tors. In addition to the above let us consider the following
circumstances surrounding this conveyance. The conveyance was voluntary and consisted of his entire estate. It
left the grantor with no property yet obliged upon a mortgage note and subject to the claims of the two men injured
in the accident, thus leaving him insolvent. The property
description contained in the questioned deed is incomplete
as compared to that conveyed to the defendants by their
predecessor in title. At the time the deed was recorded, the
accident had occurred and the notary public upon the acknowledgment was one and the same person as the attorney
who defended Mr. Dunham in the civil suits which arose
from the automobile accident. It also seems singularly unusual that these defendants would deem it advisable to consult an attorney for the purpose of preparing a deed as
between themselves for their entire property and yet feel
that such a practice was unnecessary before, and after, the
accident insofar as preparing deeds, requiring special descriptions to purchasers in business transactions. The
reason given by defendants for the conveyance from joint
tenancy to sole ownership in Mrs. Dunham, namely the
claimed illness of Mr. Dunham, seems rather feeble in view
of the recognized reason for holding property in joint tenancy. Likewise the failure to record the deed promptly does
not confirm the claimed urgency which purportedly
prompted its execution. The subsequent petition in bankruptcy by Mr. Dunham to be relieved of his obligations to
the two judgment creditors who were injured in the accident on November 8, 1953, was the last step required to
complete defendants' fraudulent scheme.
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The only opposing evidence to that above set forth is
the testimony of Mrs. Dunham and La Mar Duncan that
the deed was executed and acknowledged upon the dates
shown on its face. First of all it should be made absolutely
clear that both of these witnesses had such interests in this
deed as to prohibit their telling the truth if, as the above
evidence clearly shows, the deed was in fact predated and
fraudulently acknowledged. That they could have testified
one way or the other without impunity is not true. An admission of fraud would have caused Mrs. Dunham the loss
of her property. An admission of fraud would have caused
Mr. Duncan the loss of his professional standing in all likelihood. Thus this testimony is not the testimony of disinterested witnesses. Quite to the contrary it is elicited from
those most vitally concerned with the determination of
whether fraud existed as a matter of fact in this case.
Based upon the evidence in this case it is the plaintiff's contention that the overwhelming weight of the evidence sustains the belief that this conveyance was made
subsequent to the automobile accident giving rise to the
creditors claims and that such conveyance was made with
an actual intent on the part of the grantor and grantee to
hinder, delay and defraud the creditors in the satisfaction
of their claims and that the judgment of the lower court
is contrary to the great weight of the evidence in the case.
Plaintiff feels that the lower court in this case did not view
the evidence with the "rigid scrutiny" required in conveyances between near relatives where creditors rights against
one of such relatives is involved. See Paxton v. Paxton, 80
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U. 540, 553, 15 P. 2d 1051; Peterson

v. Peterson, 112 U. 554,

190 P. 2d 140.
Let us now assume, without admitting, that the trial
court was justified in finding that the deed in question was
actually executed and acknowledged upon the dates shown
on its face. In view of the evidence, this conveyance must
still fail as a matter of law. Section 25-1-7, U. C. A. 1953,
provides as follows:
"25-1-7. CONVEYANCE TO HINDER, DELAY, DEFRAUD CREDITORS.-Every conveyance
made, and every obligation incurred, with actual
intent, as distinguished from intent presumed in law,
to hinder, delay or defraud either present or future
creditors is fraudulent as to both present and future
creditors."
Thus a showing of an actual fraudulent intent will render
a conveyance fraudulent as to future creditors. The facts
in this case clearly support a finding of actual intent to
defraud to the exclusion of any other conclusion. The failure to record, coupled with continued possession and acts
of ownership by Mr. Dunham, as evidenced by the deeds
and mortgage subsequently executed by both defendants
as grantors, is strong evidence of such an intent. Indeed,
where the failure to record is coupled with other indicia of
fraud, it may be concluded that the transaction was fraudulent. See 24 Am. J ur., Fraudulent Conveyances, § 19, and
cases therein cited. Likewise, it has been held that placing
a deed in the hands of a grantee does not constitute delivery,
where it is shown that the intention of the parties was that
it was not to become operative immediately, and where such
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intention was evidenced by continued acts of ownership and
operation. Redmond v. Gillis, 346 Ill. 223, 178 N. E. 504;
Spero v. Bove, 116 Vt. 76, 70 A. 2d 652. As stated in 4
Tiffony Real Property, Third Edition, section 1045, page
222:
"* * * that the grantor acts as if the title
had or had not passed to the named grantee would
certainly appear to be strong evidence of his intention that the instrument should or should not operate to pass the title."
See also Jeppesen v. Jeppesen, (Iowa), 88 N. W. 2d 633;
Cardon v. Harper, 106 U. 560, 151 P. 2d 99, 154 A. L. R.
960; Losee v. Jones, 120 U. 385, 235 P. 2d 132; Mower v.
Mower, 64 U. 260, 228 P. 911. The assertion of title solely
by l\'lrs. Dunham following the accident and recordation of
the deed is further evidence that the defendants intended
such conveyance to vest title in the grantee only in the event
that unfavorable circumstances would warrant such a course
of action. The testimony of defendants' witness, Mr. Layton,
establishes that as late as September or October of 1953,
Mr. Dunham was considering a future conveyance to his
wife of his interest in the land. This is certainly incompatible with the theory that he had absolutely conveyed his
estate in the land to his wife almost a year previously or
that he intended such a conveyance, if actually made, to
alienate his interest at the time the deed was purportedly
executed. But it is compatible and entirely consistent with
plaintiffs' contention that the deed, if executed and acknowledged as stated on its face, was intended to pass title
only at such time as would be beneficial to the defendants
and detrimental to creditors. In addition we have the un-
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disputed facts that the conveyance was voluntary and left
the grantor insolvent. Section 25-1-4, U. C. A. 1953, sets
forth the law of this state as follows:
"25-1-4. CONVEYANCES BY INSOLVENT.
-Every conveyance made, and every obligation incurred, by a person who is, or will be thereby rendered, insolvent is fraudulent as to creditors, without regard to his actual intent, if the conveyance is
made or the obligation is incurred without a fair
consideration."
In anticipation of defendants' contention that this conveyance was supported by consideration in that Mrs. Dunham
allegedly paid the original down payment of $1,000.00 out
of her own money, plaintiff submits that such a finding is
absolutely contrary to the evidence and, under the evidence
introduced in this case, is contrary to law. First of all, with
reference to the question of fact, such an allegation is supported only by the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Dunham. In
order to add credence to their story it is the testimony of
both defendants that, at the time of the purchase, and for
some time prior thereto Mr. Dunham was "drinking" away
his entire income which exceeded that of his wife. Although
they stated he was drunk a good deal of the time, which
admittedly would be true if he were consuming his entire
monthly salary of $225.00 for alcohol in the years immediately preceding their original contract purchase of the
property in 1944, yet it is admitted that he never missed his
work with the Union Pacific Railroad as a result of intoxic~
tion. The most conclusive evidence against the defendants in
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this regard is that the original purchase contract was made
in the name of George R. Dunham alone. The evasive and
qualified answers given by the defendant Leoda S. Dunham
in this regard, without denying the fact, are ample to support this fact. It would seem most unlikely that Mrs. Dunham would use her own money to purchase real property and
then have it placed in her husband's name alone at a time
when he is alleged to have been a confirmed drunk. These
facts just do not adhere to logic and common sense. It also
seems most unlikely that Mrs. Dunham would allow her
husband to continue as an apparent owner, without his
making any real contribution to the business property, for
the 91f2 years following the purchase, which apparent title,
in all probability would have continued to this day had not
the automobile accident intervened. It is also stated by
both defendants in their testimony that Mr. Dunham participated in the negotiations with Mrs. Kirkpatrick for the purchase of the property. Contrary to the above we have the
statements of the defendants that it was Mrs. Dunham's
money which purchased the property. The facts do not
bear out that contention.
Secondly, as a matter of law, the statements of the
defendants are not sufficient to sustain a finding that the
alleged fraudulent conveyance was based upon a pre-existing
consideration or obligation. In the case of Paxton v. Paxton,
supra, a mortgage allegedly based upon a past due indebtedness to the defendant's brother was sustained as valid in
the lower court against the plaintiff's contention that it
constituted a fraudulent conveyance. This court, upon a
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complete analysis of the facts by virtue of its equity powers,
reversed the lower court and held as. follows :
"In reaching a conclusion as to facts, the findings made by the trial court should not be disturbed
unless we are convinced that they are wrong, but,
when so convinced, it becomes our duty to set them
aside. It is quite generally held that a transfer or
mortgage of property between near relatives which
is calculated to prevent a creditor from realizing on
his claim against one of such relatives is subject to
rigid scrutiny. 27 C. J. 495, and cases there cited.
Under the rule, a transfer or mortgage of property
made to a near relative in consideration of past-due
indebtedness will be sustained if attacked in a creditor's suit when, and only when, it is shown the debt
is genuine, that the purpose of the grantee or mortgagee is honest, and that he acted in good faith in
obtaining his title or lien. The burden, in such ease,
is cast upon the grantee or mortgagee to show the
good faith of the transaction by clear and satisfactory evidence. * * * Applying the rule to the
mortgage made by Anthony and his wife to Frank, it
cannot be said that Frank has discharged that burden. * * * There is not a scintilla of evidence,
other than the testimony of Frank and Anthony,
which shows, or tends to show, that Anthony was
indebted to Frank at the time the note and mortgage
were executed. * * * there is no documentary
evidence other than the note and mortgage here involved which supports, or tends to support, the claim
that Anthony was indebted to Frank. Such claim
rests solely upon the testimony of Anthony and
Frank. Upon this record the appellants are entitled
to a finding that the mortgage given by Anthony and
his wife to Frank was without consideration and that
it was executed for the purpose of hindering, delaying and preventing the Walkers from collecting the
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money owing to them by Anthony and his wife Ida."
(Emphasis added.)
As in the case quoted, there is not a scintilla of evidence,
other than the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Dunham which
shows, or tends to show, that the original consideration for
the purchase of the property in question was paid by Mrs.
Dunham. Under the ruling of the Paxton case, which reversed the lower court on the facts and law, the defendants
have not met the burden of showing the good faith of the
transaction by clear and satisfactory evidence. The holding
in the Paxton case was affirmed and approved in Boccalero
v. Bee, 102 U. 12, 126 P. 2d 1063, which was distinguished
on the facts in that there was ample evidence, such as cancelled checks and records of payment, of the debt owed
by the insolvent grantor to his sister as consideration for
the assignment. It is thus crystal clear that something more
than the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Dunham will be required to establish the bona fides of their claim-that additional something is lacking in the record of this case.
Without burdening the court with a long list of authorities sustaining certain factual circumstances which constitute "badges of fraud", the plaintiff herewith sets forth the
many "badges" or "indicia" of fraud which exist in the
present case and from which the existence of fraud may be
properly inferred:
1. Inadequacy of consideration, 37 C. J. S., Fraudulent
Conveyances, § 81.
2. Conveyance which leaves the grantor without any
estate or renders him insolvent. 37 C. J. S., Fraudulent Conveyances, §§ 88, 89.
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3. Withholding instrument from recordation. 37 C. J.
S., Fraudulent Conveyances, § 85.
4. Retention by the grantor of the possession of the
property and thereafter exercising acts of ownership with
the knowledge of the grantee. 37 C. J. S., Fraudulent Conveyances, § 92.
5. Close relationship between grantor and grantee, as
husband and wife. 37 C. J. S., Fraudulent Conveyances, §
96.
6. Misdescription or insufficient description of the
property transferred. 37 C. J. S., Fraudulent Conveyances,
§ 97.

The concurrence of several badges of fraud will always
make out a strong case. 37 C. J. S., Fraudulent Conveyances, § 79. As we have shown heretofore, where the failure to record, is coupled with other indicia of fraud, it may
be concluded that the transaction was fraudulent. Likewise,
as previously pointed out, the continued acts of ownership
and statements of the grantor following the purported execution of the deed, is conclusive evidence that no present
intention to convey the land was shown as of the date it was
allegedly executed and acknowledged even though the deed
was manually transferred to the grantee. See Redmond v.
Gillis, supra. In view of the failure of defendants to sustain
the burden of proving the actual purchase of the property
by Mrs. Dunham with her own money, both as a matter of
fact and as a matter of law, and the concurrence of the
above mentioned badges of fraud, it necessarily follows
that the conveyance from George R. Dunham to his wife
was a fraudulent conveyance in fact and in law against the
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creditors of defendant George R. Dunham. If the facts and
circumstances surrounding the case and directly proved are
such as, to lead a reasonable individual to the conclusion
that fraud in fact exists, this is all the proof which the law
requires. 24 Am. J ur ., Fraudulent Conveyances, § 225; Cardon v. Harper, supra.
Finally it may be laid down as a doctrine generally
accepted, that if a person, being at the time indebted, makes
a voluntary conveyance of his property to such an extent
that he is left actually insolvent, or wholly unable to pay
his existing debts, or that it is reasonable to suppose he
contemplated his consequent inability to pay, or even that
it is reasonably doubtful whether he is able to meet his obligations, then the conveyance will be fraudulent and void
as against his subsequent, as well as his existing creditors.
Pomeroy's Equity Juris prudence, Fifth Edition, § 973, pp.
880-881.
A careful analysis of the facts of this case, together
with the law governing delivery of deeds and fraudulent
conveyances, compels a reversal of the judgment of the
district court. This court has the power to review both facts
and law in equity cases by virtue of express statutory provision and the rules of procedure established by this court.
See Section 78-2-2, U. C. A. 1953 and Rule 72 (a) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In the exercise of this power
to the ends of justice this court should find, as a matter of
fact and law, that the conveyance from defendant George
R. Dunham to his wife, defendant Leoda S. Dunham, was
fraudulent as to his creditors who are represented by the
plaintiff in this action, and should therefore set aside this
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conveyance and require an accounting of all proceeds received by the defendants from the sale of portions of their
land.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN MAKING
AND ENTERING ITS FINDINGS OF FACT
NUMBERED 4, 5 AND 7 FOR THE REASON
THAT SUCH FINDINGS OF FACT ARE CONTRARY TO THE GREAT WEIGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE AND CONTRARY TO LAW.
Fact No. 4 found by the lower court holds that Leoda
S. Dunham paid the down payment upon the property from
her own money and the balance from the earnings, of the
property (R. 64). Plaintiff incorporates herein his argument under Point I with respect to the weight of the evidence. Plaintiff also incorporates herein the argument contained in Point I with regard to the law governing the finding of a pre-existing consideration based solely upon the
statements of the grantor and grantee. The rule in the
Paxton case, supra, which was affirmed in Baccalero v. Bee,
supra, is clearly controlling in this case. In the absence of
other extrinsic evidence, the bare statements of the grantor
and grantee as to a pre-existing debt or obligation constituting the, consideration for a voluntary conveyance between near relatives will be insufficient, as a matter of
law, to sustain the finding of such consideration as a matter
of fact where the conveyance is attacked by the grantor's
creditors. Such is the case here. Not one whit of evidence
was introduced to support the testimony of Mr. and Mrs.
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Dunham in this. regard and, as pointed out under Point I,
all other evidence indicates the absolute opposite fact to
that found by the lower court.
Finding of Fact No. 5 is to the effect that the deed in
question was executed, acknowledged and thereafter delivered to Leoda S. Dunham on November 1, 1952, and Finding of Fact No. 7 holds that the deed was executed and delivered without intent to defraud (R. 66). Plaintiff incorporates the argument contained in Point I to sustain
its contention that such findings are contrary to the overwhelming weight of evidence and also contrary to the law
governing fraudulent conveyances. and the delivery of deeds.
Plaintiff again reiterates that, even if the lower court had
sufficient evidence upon which to find that the deed was
actually executed and acknowledged on November 1, 1952,
the subsequent acts of ownership by Mr. Dunham without
objection by Mrs. Dunham absolutely negatives the finding
of a present intent to deliver even though there had been
a manual delivery of the deed. In addition the surrounding
circumstances amplify beyond question the fact that no
present intent to convey was ever made manifest by the
parties to this deed and that the deed was not to become
operative. immediately. See Redmond v. GiUis, supra; Spero
v. Bove, supra; Cardon v. Harper, supra; Losee v. Jones,
supra; 4 Tiffany Real Property, supra.
POINT III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN MAKING
AND ENTERING ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
FOR THE REASONS THAT THERE WAS NOT
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SUFFICIENT COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT OR WARRANT SUCH CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND SUCH CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW ARE CONTRARY TO THE LAW PERTAINING TO FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
AND DELIVERY OF DEEDS.
As pointed out under points I and II, it was clearly
error for the lower court to enter its Conclusions, of Law
to the effect that the conveyance herein involved was not
made with an intent to defraud, hinder or delay existing or
subsequent creditors, that the deed was executed, acknowledged and delivered on N ovemher 1, 1952, and that the grantor, George R. Dunham, had no interest in the said property
subsequent to that date, as set forth at pages 66-67 of the
Record on appeal, and plaintiff incorporates herein the
arguments set forth under points I and II.
POINT IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE THE
TESTIMONY OF LA MAR DUNCAN PERTAINING TO STIPULATED JUDGMENTS ENTERED IN THE CIVIL CASES BROUGHT BY
BRUCE R. SIZEMORE AND FRED B. GARRETT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT GEORGE
R. DUNHAM WHILE MR. DUNCAN WAS ATTORNEY FOR SAID DEFENDANT.
As has been stated heretofore the plaintiff's case in this
action, being one of fraud, lay primarily in the evidence to
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be elicited from the defendants and those in close confidential relationship with the defendants, outside of matters
of public record. Intent, which is an important element in
cases of fraud, is most often a matter of difficult proof
because of its concealment in the minds of the perpetrators.
In this case the actual date of the deed and the acknowledgment thereon were drawn in issue. If fraud had actually
been committed in this case by the pre-dating of the deed
and acknowledgment, and the great weight of evidence so
indicates as shown in the argument under Point I, Mr. Duncan became as much a participant in the fraud as did the
defendants. Let us now view the circumstances giving rise
to this particular point of argument.
Mr. Duncan was called as a witness at the trial by the
plaintiff. During questioning by plaintiff's counsel, Mr.
Duncan testified that he clearly remembered the date he
acknowledged this deed which was prepared as a routine
matter in his law office and that it was dated and acknowledged on the dates shown thereon (Tr. 30-33). Subsequent
to this testimony he denied having ever signed stipulated
judgments on behalf of his client, George R. Dunham, in
excess of fifty thousand dollars in 1954 as a result of civil
actions arising from the automobile accident (Tr. 34-35).
Upon being shown the stipulations in the county clerk's case
files, Mr. Duncan admitted signing the stipulated judgments
(Tr. 37-38). Thereupon the defendant renewed his objections and the court responded by striking the entire line of
questioning (Tr. 38-39). There can be no question that
plaintiff was attempting to impeach this witness. The court
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even recognized this when it denied defendants.' earlier
objection by stating as follows:
"MR. PRATT: If the court please, I object to
that as hearsay as to these defendants. This is their
witness.
"THE COURT: I'm not taking it as a fact. I
suppose he is laying a foundation for some impeaching question he is going to ask counsel or trying to
show an interest that counsel has. The objection is
overruled and you may answer that question." (Emphasis added) .
A close examination of the transcript will reveal that the
true cause of the trial court's sudden change of ruling arose
out of a mistaken concept in the mind of the trial judge that
plaintiff's counsel had attempted to delay Mr. Duncan's
appearance on the ground that certain written documents
were allegedly on their way from Salt Lake City when in
fact they were in the possession of plaintiff's counsel all
the time. In this regard it will be noted that counsel for
plaintiff asked for the delay of Mr. Duncan's appearance
as a witness because of certain conflicting affidavits to
which he was a party which were then on their way to Coalville from Salt Lake City. (Tr. 7, 28. See also the affidavit
and supporting documents filed with the court by Donn E.
Cassity, R. 72-75). Upon the introduction of the stipulated
judgments entered in prior civil cases against Mr. Dunham
and signed by his then attorney, Mr. Duncan, the court was
clearly under the impression that these documents were
the ones claimed by plaintiff's counsel to be on their way
from Salt Lake City. The judge's impression thus left him
with the feeling that plaintiff's counsel had resorted to a
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concealment of facts before the court. In fact, the court's
unjustified wrath was such that he absolutely refused to
listen to plaintiff's repeated attempts to explain the true
circumstances (Tr. 38-39).
It is plaintiff's contention that the rule against impeaching one's own witness. should have no application as to
Mr. Duncan who was the acknowledging officer before
whom the deed in question was executed. With respect to
the prohibitory rule against impeachment of one's own witness, it is stated in McCormick on Evidence, § 38, at pages
70-71:
"Among the reasons, or rationalizations, found
for the rule are, first, that the party by calling the
witness to testify vouches for his trustworthiness,
and second, that the power to impeach is the power
to coerce the witness to testify as desired, under the
implied threat of blasting his character if he does
not. The answer to the first is that, except in a few
instances such as character witnesses or expert witnesses, the party has little or no choice. He calls
only those who happen to have observed the particular facts in controversy. The answer to the second
are (a) that it applies only to two kinds of impeachment, the attack on character and the showing of
corruption, and (b) that to forbid the attack by the
party calling leaves the party at the mercy of the
witness and his adversary. If the truth lies on the
side of the calling party, but the witnesses character
is bad, if he tells the truth he may be attacked by
the adversary: if he tells a lie the adversary will not
attack him, and the calling party, under the rule,
cannot. Certainly it seems that if the witness has
been bribed to change his story, the calling party
should be allowed to disclose this to the court."
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It has been stated in many cases that the rule against im-

peachment of one's own witness is subject to exception in
the interests of justice. Schlatter v. McCarthy, 113 U. 543,
196 P. 2d 968, rehearing denied 113 U. 560, 198 P. 2d 473;
Delfino v. Warners Motor Exp., 142 Conn. 301, 114 A. 2d
205; White v. Southern Oil Stores, 198 S. C. 173, 17 S. E.
2d 150. Thus it has been stated that the purely formalistic
concept, that the party producing a witness vouches for
him and is bound by his testimony, should not preclude impeachment where fairness requires it, and the trial court
should be liberal in permitting such impeachment, resolving
all doubts in favor of allowing testimony. People v. Spinosa,
115 C. A. 2d 659, 252 P. 2d 409.
This court has had occasion to construe the testimony
of an acknowledging officer upon a deed. In the case of
Northcrest, Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 112 U. 268,
248 P. 2d 692, this court quoted with approval from 1 Am.
Jur. 380, Acknowledgment, Sec. 154, which states:

"* * * The trend or authority however, is
in favor of admitting any evidence that may have a
tendency to prove the truth, and a more liberal rule
permits the officer to be called as a witness. and
compelled under oath to state the true facts of the
transaction so far as he can remember them, whether
he acted under mistake, misapprehension, or in collusion with the party to be benefited by taking the
acknowledgment * * * "
The court then held :
"We are in accord with the foregoing rule as
better serving the purpose of getting at the truth
and doing justice between the parties."
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Furthermore our own Rules of Civil Procedure have
broadened the scope of cross examination and impeachment
to include many persons. other than strictly adverse parties.
Thus, although not himself a party to an action, an officer
of a corporation, partnership or association which is an
adverse party, may be called and cross-examined and impeached in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party. See Rule 43 (h) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Certainly Mr. Duncan in the instant case reposed in a position much more adverse to the plaintiff than
that presented in most cases which might involve an officer
of a corporation as a witness. It would seem that if such
persons as are enumerated in Rule 43 (b) may be called
as one's own witness and impeached, it is only logical that
the acknowledging officer to the execution of deed claimed
to be fraudulent as to its date of execution and acknowledgment should likewise be subjected to the test of cross examination and impeachment as to his memory, veracity, truthfulness, etc.
Plaintiff would make one more comparison. There can
be no doubt that a party may impeach the testimony of a
witness whom he is compelled to call, as a subscribing witness to a will, etc. See 98 C. J. S. Witnesses, § 477 (c);
Re Warren, 138 Ore. 283, 4 P. 2d 635, 79 A. L. R. 389;
Schlatter v. McCarthy, supra. Thus it would appear no less
logical to allow a party attacking the validity of a deed and
acknowledgment on the grounds of fraud to call, as his own
witness, all parties to the claimed fraudulent instrument and
to cross examine and impeach them, if possible, in an effort
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to disclose the element of intent so guardedly concealed
within them.
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff contends that the
lower court erred in striking from the record the damaging
evidence brought out by the cross examination of Mr. Duncan. No attorney could ever hope to be believed in asserting,
on one hand, that he could recall definitely the date of
execution and acknowledgment of a deed prepared as a
routine matter in 1952, and then, on the other hand,
suffer a lack of memory to the point of denying that
he had executed stipulated judgments in excess of fifty
thousand dollars as counsel for the same parties in late 1954.
Such evasiveness and lack of sincerity are circumstances
which the plaintiff should have been permitted to show
in proving the fraud alleged in this action.

CONCLUSION

A close examination of the facts and the law applicable
in this case reveals the following:
1. The trial court's finding that Mrs. Dunham bought
the subject property with her own money is contrary to the
great weight of the evidence and being based upon the testimony of defendants alone, cannot be sustained as a matter
of law.

2. The trial court's finding that the deed in question
was executed and acknowledged on November 1, 1952, is
contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
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3. That, even though the lower court may have found
that the deed was dated and acknowledged on November 1,
1952, its further finding that the deed was delivered on that
date is contrary to the great preponderance of evidence and,

in view of the continued acts of ownership and assertion of
title by Mr. Dunham thereafter with the grantee's knowledge
and consent cannot be sustained as a matter of law.
4. The facts and circumstances surrounding the conveyance in question, even if dated and acknowledged upon
November 1, 1952, would necessarily lead reasonable individuals to the conclusion that fraud was intended by these
defendants as to pres-ent and subsequent creditors and, in

view of the many concurring badges of fraud, including failure to record coupled with continued acts of ownership by
Mr. Dunham, it may be concluded that the conveyance was
fraudulent as a matter of law.
The plaintiff, therefore, is of the opinion that this
appeal is justified both as to the facts and the law andrequests that this honorable court set at rest, once and for
all, the fraudulent scheme of the defendants that has caused
this plaintiff, and the creditors whom he represents, to
pursue a trail of litigation covering a period of five years
with only such solace as was contemplated by Shakespeare
in Henry VI:
"Thrice is he arm'd that hath his quarrel just,
And he but naked, though lock'd up in steel,
Whose conscience with injustice is corrupted."
Plaintiff asks this honorable court to (1) set aside the
conveyance from defendant George R. Dunham to his wife,
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defendant Leoda S. Dunham, as a fraudulent conveyance calculated to defraud, hinder and delay the creditors of George
R. Dunham; (2) order the defendants, to account for the
proceeds of all sales or alienations of all or any part of said
property subsequent to said fraudulent conveyance ; ( 3)
order the defendants to account for all income derived from
said property or the use thereof subsequent to said fraudulent conveyance; ( 4) order the said property to be disposed
of in satisfaction of the claim of plaintiff in order that said
plaintiff can properly marshall the assets of the estate, of
the bankrupt defendant, George R. Dunham; ( 5) restrain
the defendant, Leoda S. Dunham, from disposing of said
real property in any manner, or from alienating the same;
( 6) grant the plaintiff his costs incurred in the court below
and upon this appeal, and (7) order such other and further
relief as to the court shall appear proper.
Respectfully submitted,
DONN E. CASSITY,
JACK L. CRELLIN,
Attorneys for Appellant.
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